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Executive Summary 
On its surface, the rapid increase of home prices in the Portland Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) 
resembles the overheated moments before the housing bubble burst in 2007. OnPoint Community 
Credit Union, concerned that history may already be repeating itself, asked the Northwest Economic 
Research Center (NERC) to investigate speculation within the Portland housing market, provide a 
forecast of home prices, and summarize potential market headwinds and tailwinds. 
To accomplish this, NERC estimates the change in local home prices due to ‘fundamental’ drivers. Using 
population and income to estimate a fundamental home price index (HPI), this analysis compares the 
fundamental HPI with the actual level of the Case-Shiller HPI to indicate that home values within the 
Portland MSA are, within a margin of error, correctly valued. This method indicates that increasing 
growth in income and migration significantly contributes to rising home prices. This comparison also 
shows a period of undervaluation following the burst of the last bubble, which helps to explain the price 
growth of the past few years (the ‘expansion phase’ of the recovery). 
This analysis uses Error-Correction (EC), General Autoregressive Moving Average (GARMA), and Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) models to forecast the inflation-adjusted Case Shiller HPI to the end of the year. The 
inherent strengths and weaknesses of these models necessitate a discussion of their assumptions and 
consequent limitations. Encouragingly, each of the models describes the same basic story: that average 
home sale prices will increase at a decreasing growth rate from June to at least December 2016. 
Changes to land use and building height restrictions are among the external shocks to home prices not 
included in the model. Since predicting policy decisions is fraught with risk, real-world awareness of 
potential political outcomes should accompany all forecasts based on known factors.   
Due to data limitations, not all of the indicators NERC feels are important to HPI are explicitly included in 
the models. Instead, these indicators offer supporting evidence. Generally, they describe a tight housing 
market with high demand (as indicated by income, employment, and migration) and low supply (as 
indicated by housing permits and inventory levels). This analysis corroborates the model estimations 
and supports the forecasts. 
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Introduction 
Still rising from the depths of the Great Recession, many buyers in the Portland housing market remain 
unable to catch their collective breath. With a housing affordability crisis and skyrocketing demand, 
people are beginning to refer to the mid-2000s housing bubble. However, real growth can warrant rising 
prices, there can be genuine economic reasons for rising demand, and affordability problems tend to 
occur in areas that are getting wealthier. This analysis will explore whether the area’s economic 
fundamentals warrant this high level of home price growth, detail market conditions, and provide a 
home price forecast.  
However, prior to that, an exploration of the last bubble will determine if history is already repeating 
itself. Figure 1 below shows three separate periods of growth for the Case-Shiller Home Price Index (HPI) 
for the Portland Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). The first, 6.74% from 1988 to the end of 2002, 
shows relatively consistent growth through the late eighties and the entirety of the nineties. Then, in 
2003, home prices began to grow at a significantly faster annual clip of 14.09% through mid-2006. This 
incredible growth ultimately proved unsustainable as home prices crashed in 2007, eventually 
bottoming out in 2012. Since then the Portland MSA has seen a strong average annual growth rate of 
9.85%.  
These growth rates give a good idea of how the mid-2000s housing bubble looked – especially the 
discord between the relatively moderate growth rate of the nineties and the large growth rate during 
the housing boom. However, growth rates are only part of the story. Tracking the factors that 
accompanied the mid-2000 housing boom will indicate if what the Portland MSA is currently 
experiencing is unwarranted speculation or a strong recovery. 
Figure 1- Case Shiller Home Price Index for Portland MSA with Average Annual Growth Rates 
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The Mid-2000’s Housing Bubble 
It is easy to conflate the burst of the housing bubble and the Great Recession due to their clear 
relationship. However, despite the two being highly interrelated and simultaneous phenomena, it is 
possible to tease out separate catalysts for each. Consensus among economists is that a major cause of 
the housing bubble was the zeitgeist known as ‘irrational exuberance’, whereas the brunt of the fault for 
the recession lies with the extreme leveraging of mortgage debts. This leaves two sets of factors to keep 
track of, those that indicate the likelihood of a housing bubble and those that indicate the damage that 
the bursting of a housing bubble would cause to the larger economy. 
A good starting point to begin tracking the factors that led to the housing boom and the Great Recession 
is the much smaller recession that preceded them. The bursting of the dot-com bubble in early 2000 led 
Alan Greenspan’s Federal Reserve to lower the target federal funds rate, consequently putting 
downward pressure on mortgage rates (see Figure 2). This accommodative policy environment fueled 
borrowing and was one of the causes of the mid-2000s credit boom (see the increased level of mortgage 
debt in Figure 3)1. 
Figure 2 – Various Interest Rates, May 1971 – July 20162 
 
Today the real interest rate3 and 30-year average fixed-mortgage rate are hovering around all-time lows. 
However, total mortgage debt outstanding has yet to return to pre-recession highs, even in nominal 
terms (see Figure 3).  
                                                          
1 Holt, Jeff. "A summary of the primary causes of the housing bubble and the resulting credit crisis: A non-technical 
paper." The Journal of Business Inquiry 8, no. 1 (2009): 120-129. 
2 Data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Freddie Mac. 
3 The real interest rate is equal to the nominal interest rate minus inflation. Because interest rates exist over the 
life of an asset, the current real interest rate is estimated using the expected rate of inflation. 
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Low mortgage rates, politics, and relaxing regulations all encouraged subprime lending in the early 
2000s. Since, under normal lending practices, subprime borrowers often could not afford the houses 
they were purchasing, their participation in the market increased demand and prices without the usual 
corresponding increase in economic fundamentals. Since subprime lending spurred non-fundamental 
price growth, by definition it contributed to artificially inflated housing prices. Today, policies such as the 
Dodd-Frank act have introduced (and reintroduced) many regulations for the financial sector that 
include tighter restrictions on mortgage lending. Perhaps consequently, there has been little sign of a 
resurgence of subprime lending in the housing market until recently. 
Although subprime lending certainly played a role in the housing bubble, ‘irrational exuberance’ is likely 
more culpable for the rampant overvaluation of houses. ‘Irrational exuberance’ is a phrase coined by 
Alan Greenspan at the onset of the late nineties stock bubble and adopted by Robert Shiller as the title 
for his seminal book on asset bubbles4. It refers to a cultural mood that leads to systematic asset 
overvaluation; in this case, the society-wide belief that, since home prices had not fallen since the Great 
Depression, it was highly improbable or even impossible that home prices will ever fall5. 
Since people perceived house-prices as ever-increasing, “flipping houses”, subprime lending, securitizing 
mortgages, and buying a home beyond the normal price range appeared to be near risk-free ways of 
making money. Since any asset with perceived high returns and low risk is going to be exceptionally 
expensive, as this speculative fervor increased so did home prices.  
Figure 3 – Mortgage Debt Outstanding, Millions of Dollars, Federal Reserve Board 
                                                          
4 Shiller, Robert J. Irrational Exuberance. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005. 
5 This is an example of the fallacy of unwarranted extrapolation. 
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‘Irrational Exuberance’, or the complex set of behavioral factors responsible for market overvaluation, is by nature 
difficult to quantify. One method to capture this zeitgeist is through and examination of Google search phrases in 
the Portland MSA. Figure 4 below shows the Google Trend history of three phrases typically associated with 
‘irrational exuberance’ in relation to the housing bubble.  
In a Google Trend graph, the vertical axis represents how often an area searches for a particular term relative to 
the total number of searches. The number is indexed and normalized, so a ‘100’ indicates the period when Oregon 
had the biggest proportion of global searches for the given term, relative to its own history. Notably the largest 
spikes happened between late 2003 and mid-2005, before steadily declining from that point on. This fits in well 
with NERC’s estimated timeframe of the bubble for the Portland MSA (see Figure 14). 
 
Figure 4 – Google Trends by Search Phrase in Oregon 
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Current Market Factors 
Since historical relationships predicate statistical analysis, there exists the possibility that a variable that 
was previously unrelated (or unquantifiable) becomes a strong influence on current and future 
outcomes. In addition, many of the variables in the forecasting models (see methodology) warrant a 
qualitative discussion, as a purely statistical exploration would paint an incomplete picture.  
Employment and Income 
Two of the most fundamental economic indicators are employment and income. In terms of home 
prices, income and employment indicate whether people can afford current and future increases. NERC 
forecasts employment in the Portland MSA will continue its strong recovery until reaching the rate of 
full-employment (see Figure 5) indicating that  buyers will continue to enter the housing market 
(assuming home prices are correctly valued). 
Figure 5–Total Nonfarm Employment, Bureau of Labor Statistics and NERC, Portland MSA 
 
Wage growth finally picked up from its relatively weak post-crisis pace in the second half of 2015. All 
indications6 are that this has continued into 2016. Figure 6 shows both the recent upturn in wages, and 
the effect of the recession on wages. Taken in conjunction with the increasing levels of employment, 
improving wages indicate that people can now afford higher priced housing.  Employment and wages 
are also strong factors for net migration, which the subsequent section discusses. 
                                                          
6 Particularly in the national Employment Situation Reports from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
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Figure 6 – Quarterly Wage Growth, Bureau of Labor Statistics (QCEW), Portland MSA
 
Migration and Portland’s Relative Affordability 
Despite the recent surge in home prices, Portland remains among the cheapest major West Coast cities 
to buy a house. This is partly because home price levels have historically been lower in Portland than its 
neighbors, but also because Portland’s growth in home prices is average for these cities since 2010. In 
fact, places like San Francisco have had significantly higher rates of growth until 2015. Figure 7 shows 
the relative costs of five of the West Coast’s largest metros. 
Figure 7– Home Price ‘Zestimates7’ by Metro Area, Zillow 
 
                                                          
7 Zillow’s estimated market value index. See the methodology for more details: 
http://www.zillow.com/research/zhvi-methodology-6032/ 
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The combination of a strong job market with relatively lower house prices, Oregon and the Portland 
MSA have among the nation’s highest rates of in-migration – which in turn increases demand for 
housing. Figure 8 shows the total net migration for the four largest Portland MSA counties, and gives 
evidence of a return to peak levels by 2015. Of the variables that affect population forecasts – 
migration, death rates, and birth rates – migration has by far the strongest affect due to its high 
variability. 
Figure 8 – Net Migration by Portland MSA County, 2001-2015 
 
This strong migration is included in the statistical analysis8 in the form of population growth, and is one 
of the fundamental drivers of home prices. It is of note that in 2015 roughly 28.5% of all migrants to 
Oregon were Californian and 16% were Washingtonian (as determined by licenses surrendered to the 
Oregon DMV). Considering the affordability problems in San Francisco and Seattle, Portland’s relative 
cheapness, and their proximity, this is of little surprise.  
Housing Permits and Inventory 
Outside of income and employment, the next most vital economic indicator of economic activity is 
housing supply. Good proxies for housing supply are new housing permit applications and homes 
available for sale (inventory). New permits indicate increasing home supply, which creates downward 
pressure for home prices. As seen in Figure 9, new housing permits have been among the slowest 
recovering economic indicators in the Portland MSA9. Relative to the strong migration and income-
driven demand, the supply is lagging behind. Often, lagging supply is due to strict land zoning laws10. 
While input prices, such as wages and lumber, have increased only moderately in the Portland MSA, 
these regulations have made land progressively more valuable. The affordability problems Portland is 
                                                          
8 Specifically the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Fundamental HPI models. See below. 
9 See Appendix A for NERC’s Permits Forecasts 
10 Glaeser, E. L., & Gyourko, J. (2002). The impact of zoning on housing affordability (No. w8835). National Bureau 
of Economic Research. 
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experiencing puts a magnifying glass up to land-use planning, and reports such as the City of Portland’s 
recent Portland Comprehensive Plan hint at more accommodative zoning requirements. 
Figure 9 – Single Family Permits, Portland MSA 
Not only is the Portland MSA producing new buildings at a relatively slow rate, but also fewer homes are 
available for sale than ever before. Homes available for sale are hovering around decade lows (see 
Figure 10) and, at the rate they are selling, would only last for approximately two months before supply 
would be depleted (see Figure 11).  
Figure 10 –Portland MSA Homes Available for Sale, Seasonally Adjusted (SA), Monthly, RMLS Market 
Action Report 
 
2,000
4,000
6,000
8,000
10,000
12,000
14,000
16,000
18,000
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
THE STATE OF THE PORTLAND MSA HOUSING MARKET | 12 
 
 
   
Northwest Economic Research Center   
  
  
 
Figure 11 – Portland MSA Months of Inventory, Monthly, RMLS Market Action Report 
 
Homeownership and Demographic Shifts 
A demographic group that is of great importance to homeownership trends is the 20-30 year old cohort. 
Having recently replaced the baby-boomers as the largest cohort in size, they will soon be entering the 
30-40 year old age bracket– a movement that typically constitutes the greatest uptick in 
homeownership. As Figure 12 shows, homeownership rates and vacancy rates are at historic lows, 
meaning when the 20-30 year old cohort ages into the homeownership years there will be greater 
demand, an increase in the overall homeownership rate, and even more upward pressure on home 
prices. Homeownership and vacancy rates are simply another way of gauging the tightness of the 
market. 
Figure 12 – Census Homeownership and Homeowner Vacancy Rates for the Portland MSA 
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Methodology 
NERC’s two modeling goals are to (1) estimate an index that determines the current and historical 
fundamental value of houses and (2) forecast the actual level home prices.  To accomplish this, NERC 
uses a variety of tools. The estimation technique for the fundamental Home Price Index (HPI) is, by 
necessity, simple. Including too many variables makes the model vulnerable to picking up noise related 
to the exact phenomena it is supposed to ignore – speculation-led price fluctuations such as the mid-
2000s bubble. The forecasting models use more mathematically complex techniques, which add 
precision to the forecast at the cost of higher risk for theoretical error. However, by using three models, 
NERC mitigates these downsides by ensuring that the forecast estimates provided are rigorous across 
specifications. 
Fundamental HPI Model 
The first modeling task is to estimate the current and historical fundamental value for houses. 
Separating out an asset’s “intrinsic” worth from speculative mispricing is a difficult and subtle task that 
necessitates a strong theoretical foundation and a high-threshold for variable inclusion. This report 
defines the fundamental price as fluctuations in the inflation adjusted Case-Shiller HPI due to 
corresponding fluctuations in population and real per capita income. The Case-Shiller Price Index is 
inflation adjusted with the Portland MSA Consumer Price Index (CPI) sans shelter to prevent the 
exponential growth seen in nominal price series. NERC estimates the fundamental HPI using Ordinary 
Least Squares (OLS) and displays the results below in Table 1. 
Table 1: Fundamental HPI 
Dependent Variable: Real HPI, SA Sample: 1990M01-2016M05 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability 
C -4.970794 2.194043 -2.265586 2.42% 
Log(Population) 0.327755 0.168832 1.941308 5.31% 
Real Personal Income Per Capita 4.66244 1.466506 3.179284 0.16% 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.674504    
 
“Fundamental” implies that the drivers of the relationship are the most closely linked with supply and 
demand for the given market. For example, in a simple labor market model, available jobs would be a 
proxy for supply, the number of job seekers would be a proxy for demand, and together they would be 
the fundamental drivers of wages (the price variable). In this equation, population acts as a supply 
constraint, income proxies for demand, and HPI is the price variable. Since the Portland MSA has an 
exhaustible supply of buildable land, as more people enter the metro and purchase a home the supply 
decreases, which puts upward pressure on prices. Similarly, if someone’s income increases then he/she 
can afford a higher quality house, which will increase the area’s average home price. Since these two 
variables rarely decline, it follows that home prices should rise consistently. There is evidence of 
speculative mispricing when the fundamental HPI and actual HPI diverge. This report uses the phrase 
‘speculative mispricing’ to indicate when an asset is either overvalued or undervalued relative to its 
fundamental drivers. 
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HPI Forecast Models 
NERC’s second modeling task is to forecast home prices. Home prices are driven by a wide variety of 
factors that are either difficult to quantify, e.g. speculation, or difficult to forecast, e.g. land-use 
regulations. Given these restrictions, NERC uses three distinct models to forecast home prices, each with 
their own strengths and limitations. Just as in George Box’s famous aphorism “All models are wrong but 
some are useful,” the usefulness of the models below depends on an understanding of their purpose.  
The first model used is an error-correction model (EC). An EC model assumes an equilibrium – i.e. the 
estimated fundamental HPI – and estimates the reaction of the dependent variable – i.e. the real Case-
Shiller HPI11– to disequilibrium12. Assuming the correct estimation of the model, the error-correction 
term pushes the dependent variable back towards the assumed equilibrium. Since the forecast begins in 
a slight disequilibrium in May 2016, the model pushes the subsequent months HPI down towards the 
level of the fundamental HPI. If this model’s predictions diverge away from the actual price without a 
corresponding exogenous13 shock then that indicates speculative mispricing is taking place. Table 2 
displays the results of the EC model below. 
Table 2: Error-Correction Model 
 
A  General Autoregressive Moving Average model (GARMA), the second model used, is atheoretical in 
that it contains no other variables outside of historical responses to itself. These exclusively use 
autoregressive (AR) and moving average (MA) terms that estimate the linear relationship between the 
current value and last period’s value and error respectively. Financial analysts typically use atheoretical 
approaches more often than their economist counterparts do; however, this particular technique is 
among the most accurate for short term HPI forecasting14.  Table 3 displays the results of the GARMA 
estimation. 
                                                          
11 Even though the relationship between the variables in the models are in real terms, the forecasts are of the 
nominal HPI. 
12 Malpezzi, Stephen. "A simple error correction model of house prices." Journal of housing economics 8, no. 1 
(1999): 27-62. 
13 Exogenous in this context refers to any variable outside the model (e.g. mortgage rates). 
14 Miles, William. "Boom–bust cycles and the forecasting performance of linear and non-linear models of house 
prices." The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics 36, no. 3 (2008): 249-264. 
Dependent Variable: Change in Real HPI, SA Sample: 1990M01-2016M05 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-Statistic Probability 
C 0.000369 0.00019 1.947733 5.2% 
Error-Correction Term (Last Period's Difference 
between HPI and the Fundamental HPI, Cubed)  
-0.160633 0.091722 -1.751303 8.1% 
The Change in Last Period's HPI 0.786979 0.034757 22.64221 0.0% 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.620014       
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Table 3: General Autoregressive Model 
Dependent Variable: Log of HPI, SA Sample: 1990M01-2016M05 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-Statistic Probability 
C 5.226581 0.470939 11.09822 0% 
AR(1) 1.455484 0.014893 97.7304 0% 
AR(3) -0.456123 0.014728 -30.96938 0% 
MA(3) -0.352558 0.05899 -5.976539 0% 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.999845       
 
The final model uses ordinary least squares (OLS) to regress home prices on the unemployment rate, the 
mortgage rate, population, inventory (lagged six months), and last period’s rate of change in home 
prices. Table 4 displays the exact specification for this model. Inventory is directly included in this model, 
and the recent uptick in inventory is a large reason for the waning price growth forecast. NERC does not 
go as far as forecasting inventory, but should the increasing rate of new construction hold, then the 
market will eventually loosen. The low supply (inventory) and rising demand (income) are major drivers 
of the model’s results, and thus good variables to track for predicting future movements. 
Table 4: OLS Model 
Dependent Variable: Logged Difference of SA HPI  Sample: 1990M01-2016M05 
Variable 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
t-Statistic Probability 
C -0.004756 0.001452 -3.274755 0.1% 
Logged difference of unemployment -0.08124 0.020943 -3.87906 0.0% 
Logged difference of last period's HPI 0.62266 0.059799 10.41247 0.0% 
Logged difference of population 5.233963 1.361523 3.844198 0.0% 
Difference of Inventory from Six Months ago -2.94E-06 1.14E-06 -2.594091 1.1% 
Adjusted R-Squared 0.758179       
 
The population variable loosely captures the effect of Portland’s inelastic land supply. To avoid a 
sprawling metropolis, the Oregon Metro strictly regulates density outside of its borders while 
simultaneously encouraging density within through the Urban Growth Boundary. However, if there were 
no UGB, then the effect of an increasing the population would have a less marked effect on supply (and 
home prices). The inclusion of population in the model means that there is some accounting for this 
controlled land supply.                            
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Although the prevailing mortgage rate certainly affects home prices, scholars have shown this to be a 
long-run phenomenon that does not statistically exist in the short-term15. NERC attempted a number of 
econometric techniques – including variable manipulation and assorted lag structures - and were not 
able to capture a statistically significant short-term relationship between mortgage rates and HPI. Both 
the data’s frequency (monthly) and brief history (earliest data begins January of 1990) limit this analysis 
to the short-term.  
Model Evaluation 
A typical technique for evaluating model performance is by forecasting in sample and measuring the 
difference between the forecast and the actual data (see Appendix D for output). Of the three models 
implemented in this study, the worst performer is the Error Correction model. This is not surprising as 
the movement from an over/undervalued house back to the fundamental price is often slow and 
incongruous. Because of this incongruity, this model fares poorly in the evaluation framework. If the 
actual price lines up with the fundamental price, and one assumes that this will continue, it follows that 
the EC model will be the most precise (given an accurate forecast of the fundamental price). Thus, the 
forecast for the EC model going forward is practically the same as the forecast of the fundamental HPI. 
This will be accurate given that this equivalency holds and NERC has accurately modeled the 
fundamental HPI.  
The GARMA model is the most accurate of the three for short-term forecasting (it has the lowest mean 
absolute percent error); and the OLS Forecast does the best job of catching the turns and over a longer 
period (variance is the largest component of the mean square error and its predictions are the closest to 
the final in-sample value). These differences conform to expectations since the GARMA primarily uses 
short-term fluctuations to predict short-term fluctuations, and the OLS model is dependent on the 
evolution of longer-term economic variables. Since the OLS model is dependent on forecasts of other 
economic variables, it is less precise than it appears in sample (where it is predicting based on the 
actual, non-forecasted, values).  
Each of these models has a specific purpose: The EC model helps to highlight speculative mispricing, the 
GARMA model predicts near-term HPI fluctuations, and the OLS model gives an idea of where home 
prices will be in the longer run. Each of these models also has certain limitations. Economic variables do 
not influence the GARMA model, so the relationship weakens significantly as the economic landscape 
changes. The OLS model is dependent on the relationship between HPI and its predictors remaining 
relatively stable, as well as the forecast of those predictors being accurate. As mentioned above, the EC 
model enforces an equilibrium and is only as predictive as the strength of the relationship. 
One concern, unrelated to assumptions made, is each models’ quickly expanding confidence intervals. 
The confidence intervals for the EC forecast, shown below in Figure 13, emphasize the uncertainty in 
forecasting home prices too far into the future. For example, these confidence intervals imply a roughly 
15% chance of the HPI declining by the end of the year. A slight decline in HPI is not unprecedented, but 
                                                          
15 McGibany, J. M., & Nourzad, F. (2004). Do lower mortgage rates mean higher housing prices?. Applied 
Economics, 36(4), 305-313. 
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would certainly be unexpected given the current market conditions. This is not to indicate the model is 
without predictive power, simply that there is a range of possible outcomes given each of the 
assumptions and this range will expand beyond the point of usefulness over a long enough timeline. The 
other forecasts have similar confidence intervals (see Appendix C). 
 
Figure 13 – Forecasted (EC) Case-Shiller HPI with 68% and 95% Confidence Intervals, Portland MSA 
2016 
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Results 
Using the estimated equations, NERC forecasts HPI in three different ways and estimates the historical 
fundamental HPI to give a quantitative description of historical market divergence from fundamentals. 
Except for unemployment, the data for which is from the Oregon Office of Economic Analysis (see 
Appendix B, Figure 18), this analysis uses NERC’s forecasts of the necessary right-hand side variables. 
Fundamental HPI Back-cast 
The fundamental home price index confirms not only that there was a large bubble starting in 2003 and 
ending sometime around 2009, but also that this was followed by a period of undervaluation as lending 
standards tightened, foreclosures increased and, in general, demand fell. This undervaluation partially 
explains why home prices have been able to grow so quickly in recent years relative to the economic 
fundamentals – home prices are playing catch up16. Although, some economists peg the bubble’s 
beginning date to be earlier than 2003, this does not discount NERC’s estimated timeframe since prices 
rose nationally well before they did in the Portland MSA (see Appendix B Figure 19). Figure 14 shows the 
history for the fundamental HPI.  
Figure 14 – Real Case Shiller Index, fundamental Home Price Index, Portland MSA  
 
One area of concern is that population and income data are typically of an annual frequency and 
released with a 1-2 year lag meaning we must estimate Population and Income for 2016. However, it 
adds confidence that the estimated lines up with more simple metrics such as a comparison with the 
long-trend (see Figure 15).  
                                                          
16 Business-cycle scholars refer to this as the ‘recovery stage’. 
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Figure 15 – NERC’s Estimated Real Case-Shiller HPI17 with Long Run Trend 
 
While one may perceive the fundamental HPI to indicate that home prices are correctly valued, there 
exists some margin of error since the determinants of the current fundamental HPI are forecasts 
themselves. To clarify, income and population may be slightly higher than NERC forecasted for 2016 and 
home prices would then be correctly priced or even under-valued. Thus, the fundamental HPI drifting 
slightly above or below the actual HPI is an unremarkable event. 
Notably, the real Case-Shiller HPI barely surpasses the fundamental HPI as of May 2016. This does not 
mean home prices will not fall, just that there is no evidence in this model of the speculative mispricing. 
The late growth in the fundamental HPI is due to the recovery of wages and strong in-migration.  
Forecasts 
Taking into account the above concerns, NERC forecasts that home prices will continue to rise in the 
Portland MSA but that the growth rate will decline (see Table 5). Should this not be the case, and prices 
continue to accelerate, this alone would not be indicative of a bubble unless this growth is driven by 
unjustified speculation. Variables that are not included in the models could, for non-speculative reasons, 
drive prices up (or down) significantly. 
Not only do all three forecasts give similar results, but they also predict a similar long-term annual 
growth rate of roughly 6%. This is within 1% of the pre-bubble annual growth rate discussed in the 
introduction and provides a good baseline for how home prices should typically grow. Figure 16 shows 
how close each of the forecasts are to one another.  
                                                          
17 NERC forecasts CPI-sans-shelter (1982-1984 = 100) for the Portland MSA until May 2016, and uses the actual 
values of the Case-Shiller index to derive the Real Case-Shiller HPI. 
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Table 5 – EC, GARMA, and OLS HPI Forecasts with annualized growth rates, 2016 
Month EC Forecast GARMA Forecast OLS Forecast 
May18 200.91 200.91 200.91 
   % Annual 9.99% 9.99% 9.99% 
June 202.38 202.36 202.57 
   % Annual 8.79% 8.68% 9.91% 
July 203.71 203.83 204.11 
   % Annual 7.87% 8.70% 9.13% 
August 204.92 205.17 205.68 
   % Annual 7.16% 7.93% 9.25% 
September 206.05 206.49 207.03 
   % Annual 6.60% 7.72% 7.88% 
October 207.11 207.74 208.28 
   % Annual 6.18% 7.26% 7.27% 
November 208.12 208.95 209.51 
   % Annual 5.85% 6.96% 7.09% 
December 209.09 210.10 210.45 
   % Annual 5.60% 6.60% 5.35% 
 
Figure 16 – Forecasted Case-Shiller HPI by Model, 2016 
 
 
                                                          
18 The number for May is the actual Case-Shiller HPI and is included for reference. 
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Conclusion 
The upsurge in home prices over the past few years is not only a result of an increase in the economic 
fundamentals but also due to the nascent recovery of the housing market. Just as Gross Domestic 
Product experiences an ‘expansion phase’ following a recession, everyone also expect home prices to 
rebound following a significant downturn. Percent growth tends to be higher during this rebound when 
compared to other periods due in part to a ‘base effect’ (lower starting levels inflate percent growth 
calculations). It can be helpful to view growth relative to a given historical period, rather than month-to-
month or period-to-period changes. For example, NERC estimates the Portland MSA real Case-Shiller HPI 
is roughly 7% below the pre-recession peak of nine years ago. The commonly reported Case-Shiller HPI, 
which does not account for inflation, puts the Portland MSA at roughly 9% above the pre-recession 
peak. As with all price levels, accounting for inflation strongly influences the narrative.  
A range of other market factors corroborates the argument that home prices are rising for “true” 
economic reasons. A simple approach for understanding these factors is to split them into two 
categories: those that affect supply and those that affect demand. Income best predicts demand since 
people can afford homes that are more expensive when it rises. Consequently, rising incomes will 
increase the average price of houses. Due to Portland’s relatively strict land-use planning and the 
principle of scarcity, land value (and therefore home value) should continue to rise as more and more 
people fit into a limited space19. Both the supply side of the equation and the demand side point to 
rising home prices – a pattern that NERC expects to continue into the future. Basic economics of supply 
and demand predict the same outcomes as technical models. 
Although the Portland housing market is exceedingly tight, with inventories just above their lowest point 
since 2000, NERC finds that home prices are approximately valued at their fundamental worth. Should 
there be a wave of new construction then there is some risk of housing prices falling; similarly, housing 
prices could continue their strong growth if the dearth of supply continues. NERC concludes that rising 
home prices will continue, albeit with some decline in growth rate, until the end of the year. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
19 Actual land-use planning does not happen in a vacuum. Presumably, as density increases and buildable land 
becomes scarcer, then land-use requirements will be relaxed.  
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Appendix A: NERC County Housing Permits Forecasts 
 
Table 6- Forecasted Single Family Housing Permits by County, Census Building Permit Survey 
Place 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2 2016Q3 
Clackamas 325 486 415 383 389 370 368 
Clark 500 570 567 558 621 626 531 
Columbia 14 27 33 32 23 27 30 
Multnomah 285 334 252 202 220 267 269 
Skamania 8 13 15 9 9 13 13 
Washington 336 572 482 344 548 421 432 
Yamhill 76 98 96 81 62 85 90 
Portland 
MSA 
1,544 2,100 1,860 1,609 1,872 1,885 1,742 
 
 
Figure 17 – Forecasted Single Family Housing Permits by County, Census Building Permit Survey 
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Appendix B: Other Data 
Figure 18 – Oregon Unemployment Rate, Forecasted by the OEA 
 
Figure 19 –Case Shiller Index, Portland MSA and 20-City Composite 
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Appendix C: Confidence Bands 
Figure 20 – Forecasted (GARMA) Case-Shiller HPI with 68% and 95% Confidence Intervals, Portland 
MSA 2016 
 
Figure 21 – Forecasted (OLS) Case-Shiller HPI with 68% and 95% Confidence Intervals, Portland MSA 
2016 
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Appendix D: Forecast Error 
Table 7- One-Month out Forecast Error 
Sample:1990m01-2014m12 Forecast: 2015m01     
Model GARMA OLS Error-Correction 
Mean Absolute Percent Error 0.05% 1.55% 1.88% 
 
 
Table 8- Full Sample Forecast Error 
Sample: 1990m01-2016m05 Forecast: 1990m01-2016m05   
Model GARMA OLS Error-Correction 
Mean Absolute Percent Error 9.89% 5.49% 9.48% 
Theil Inequality Coefficient 0.067 0.022 0.077 
            Bias Proportion 0.161 0.060 0.156 
            Variance Proportion 0.007 0.180 0.094 
            Covariance Proportion 0.831 0.758 0.749 
Predicted for 2016m05 190 201 207 
Actual for 2016m05 202 202 202 
 
 
